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Simple Justice: In re J.D.B. and Custodial Interrogations*
INTRODUCTION
"You have the right to remain silent." Thus begins a refrain
made familiar to Americans through seemingly endless repetition on
Law & Order, Cops, and many other popular depictions of police
interrogations. In the real world, this ritualistic incantation of rights is
much more than a dramatic moment-it is an important protection
against police coercion. Indeed, it is a constitutional imperative.'
Miranda v. Arizona2 and the eponymic police warnings which it
mandated shield the Fifth Amendment rights of individuals from the
vast coercive power of the state. At its core, Miranda requires "the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination."4 Defining the contours of these procedural
safeguards is a task that has troubled judges and scholars alike.' More
basic, however, than the thorny questions of what constitutes a
sufficient Miranda warning,6 and how that standard should change in
special contexts,' is the foundational question of when a suspect must
be Mirandized.
In December 2009, the Supreme Court of North Carolina took
up this question and provided an alarming answer. In In re J.D.B.,
the court held that a juvenile's age was irrelevant to the inquiry into
whether an interrogation was "custodial" under chapter 7B, section
2101 of the General Statutes of North Carolina,' which provides for
* @ 2011 Clay Turner.
1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 467-73.
4. Id. at 445.
5. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation,
2000 SuP. CT. REV. 61, 63-65; David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress,
99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 961-69 (2001).
6. See, e.g., Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1203-04 (2010) (examining whether a
suspect was adequately apprised of his right to have counsel present during the interview
by a warning which informed him of his right to counsel before questioning).
7. North Carolina, for example, has legislatively provided for an enhanced Miranda
warning requirement for juveniles. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101 (2009).
8. 363 N.C. 664, 686 S.E.2d 135 (2009), cert. granted sub nom. J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 79 U.S.L.W. 3268 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2010).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101.
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an enhanced Miranda warning for juveniles.o Perhaps more
troubling, the court created, out of whole cloth, a higher bar for
finding police interrogations custodial when conducted inside school,
as opposed to outside of school." Together these findings will allow
the police to elide the Fifth Amendment and the added protections of
section 2101 by conducting in-school interrogations of juveniles about
out-of-school crimes. If it stands uncorrected, In re J.D.B. will
incentivize the targeting of children in our schools to obtain coerced
confessions.
This Recent Development contends that in the In re J.D.B.
majority's search for simple rules-for police and for courts-simple
justice for North Carolina's children was lost. Part I sets forth the
factual background and the central holding of the In re J.D.B.
decision. Part II argues that the court erred by refusing to consider
age in the Miranda in-custody test. Part III contends that the court
further erred by creating a wholly new presumption that an in-
custody finding for a student at school requires restraint by police of a
nature that goes far beyond the inherent restrictions of the school
environment. Finally, Part IV proposes two simple amendments to
section 2101 which would correct these mistakes. In its entirety, this
Recent Development provides an argument for why, in light of In re
J.D.B.'s harshly restrictive new in-custody test, the General Assembly
should amend the North Carolina Juvenile Justice Reform Act of
199812 (the "Juvenile Justice Act") to give section 2101 the renewed
force needed to accomplish its important mission.
I. INRE.J.D.B.
On September 24, 2005, uniformed and armed police officers
escorted J.D.B., a thirteen-year-old seventh grade student at Smith
Middle School in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, from his class to a
closed conference room where a Chapel Hill Police investigator
interrogated him for thirty to forty-five minutes.13 The investigator
gave J.D.B. neither a Miranda warning nor the enhanced warning
required under section 2101.14 When questioned, J.D.B. at first denied
10. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 671-72, 686 S.E.2d at 139-40.
11. See id. at 669-70, 686 S.E.2d at 138.
12. Juvenile Justice Reform Act, ch. 202, 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws 695 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. chs. 7, 14, 17, 114, 115, 143, 147, and
153).
13. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 666-67, 686 S.E.2d at 136-37; id. at 678, 686 S.E.2d at 143
(Brady, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 666, 686 S.E.2d at 136 (majority opinion).
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involvement in any criminal activity." At last, under pressure from his
assistant principal to "do the right thing," and after the police
investigator informed him that a stolen camera had already been
found,16 J.D.B. asked if he "would still be in trouble if he gave the
items back."17 Following this exchange, J.D.B. confessed to stealing
from two Chapel Hill homes.18
J.D.B. was charged with two counts each of breaking and
entering and larceny. 9 He filed a motion to suppress the confession.2 0
The trial court denied the motion and subsequently adjudicated
J.D.B. delinquent.2' After remanding for further factual findings on
the custody issue, a divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's ruling that J.D.B was not in custody and that the
confession was admissible.22 The Supreme Court of North Carolina
affirmed the court of appeals finding that J.D.B. was not in "police
custody such that the officers should have afforded him the protection
of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101." 23 The court rested its holding on its reading
of a non-precedential United States Supreme Court decision,
Yarborough v. Alvarado,24 as well as on its unsupported contention
that a student's already limited freedom of action at school creates a
higher bar for determining that an interrogation is custodial.25
II. CONSIDERATION OF A JUVENILE'S AGE IS PROPER UNDER
NORTH CAROLINA'S "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST
To determine whether an interrogation is custodial, North
Carolina employs "an objective test as to whether a reasonable
person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to be in
custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some
significant way." 26 The In re J.D.B. majority applied this test for
custody as the prerequisite trigger for both the Fifth Amendment's
Miranda protection and the enhanced Miranda protections of section
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 670, 686 S.E.2d at 139.
18. Id. at 666, 686 S.E.2d at 137.
19. Id. at 665, 686 S.E.2d at 136.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 664-65, 686 S.E.2d at 135-36.
23. Id. at 665, 686 S.E.2d at 136.
24. 541 U.S. 652 (2004); see discussion infra Part II.
25. See discussion infra Part III.
26. State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992) (citing Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 497 (1977) (per curiam)).
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2102.27 The analytical roots of this test, as well as the public policy
considerations that Miranda and its progeny were designed to protect,
counsel toward the consideration of age in the test to determine
custody. Because the In re J.D.B majority relied so heavily on
language from the United States Supreme Court in Alvarado, it is
useful to turn first to the development of the Supreme Court's
"reasonable person" standard before examining both the unfortunate
break from North Carolina law that In re J.D.B represents as well as
the negative public policy implications of that decision.
A. Defining "Custodial" from Miranda to Alvarado
In the years following Miranda, circuits were split over whether
the test to determine custody should be subjective or objective.28 In
Berkemer v. McCarty,29 the Court resolved this split and adopted an
objective, "reasonable person" test, holding that a "policeman's
unarticulated plan" to not let a suspect leave did not affect "whether
[the] suspect was 'in custody' " and that "the only relevant inquiry is
how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have
understood his situation."3 0 A decade later, in Thompson v.
Keohane,3 1 the Court clarified the test, explaining that "[t]wo discrete
inquiries are essential to the [custody] determination: first, what were
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given
those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she
was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave."3 2
As a conceptual starting point, it should be noted that age, if it is
to be taken into account, may be considered under either part of
Keohane's two part test; it may be viewed as part of "the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation" on the one hand, or, on
the other, as characteristic of the "reasonable person." Accordingly,
some courts have treated age as a factor in the totality of the
circumstances test while leaving the reasonable person standard
unmodified.34 At the same time, the roots of this "reasonable person"
27. See In reJ.D.B., 363 N.C. at 669-72, 686 S.E.2d at 138-40.
28. See Jefferson V. Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What
Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C. L. REV. 699, 707-35 (1974) (discussing several
cases interpreting the ruling of Miranda and the perspective a court should take for
determining custody).
29. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
30. Id. at 442.
31. 516 U.S. 99 (1995).
32. Id. at 112.
33. See id.
34. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
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standard can be traced back to tort law, which has long recognized
the consideration of age through the use of a "modified" reasonable
person test."
In Yarborough v. Alvarado,3 6 the Supreme Court-ignoring the
tort law origins of the reasonable person standard and the mere
possibility of including age as an objective fact in the "totality of the
circumstances"-suggested that age should not be considered in the
objective test for custody under Miranda." Five Justices joined the
majority opinion and held that a California state court had not
"unreasonably applied clearly established law when it held that the
respondent was not in custody for Miranda purposes."" Strictly
speaking, the holding in Alvarado was that age did not have to be
considered, not that it could not be considered." The opinion simply
found that failure to consider age was not an "unreasonable
application of clearly established law."40 In overturning the Ninth
Circuit, the Court reasoned that "the Court of Appeals [had] ignored
the argument that the custody inquiry states an objective rule
designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a
suspect's individual characteristics-including his age-could be
viewed as creating a subjective inquiry."4 1 Without explicitly holding
whether age could or could not be considered in the test, the Court
simply concluded that California's failure to consider Alvarado's age
did not "provide a proper basis for finding that the state court's
decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established law."42
Accordingly, as a limited review of a state court's application of
established federal case law, Alvarado provides no definitive answer
to the question of when, if ever, age should be considered in the
determination of whether an interaction was custodial.
35. See Tara L. Curtis, Recent Development, Yarborough v. Alvarado: Self-
Incrimination Clause Does Not Require Consideration of Age and Inexperience in the
Miranda Custody Context, 40 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 313, 320-21 (2005) (discussing the
tort law origins of the reasonable person test).
36. 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
37. See id. at 668. But see id. at 673-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The 'reasonable
person' standard does not require a court to pretend that Alvarado was a 35-year-old with
aging parents whose middle-aged children do what their parents ask only out of respect.
Nor does it say that a court should pretend that Alvarado was the statistically determined
'average person'-a working, married, 35-year-old white female with a high school
degree."); id. at 674 ("In this case, Alvarado's youth is an objective circumstance that was
known to the police.").
38. Id. at 655 (majority opinion).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 668.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id.
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Further casting doubt on Alvarado's disapproval of the
consideration of age in the Miranda custody inquiry, Justice
O'Connor, while providing the fifth vote for the bare majority
decision, also wrote separately. Justice O'Connor's concurrence
somewhat obliquely proclaimed that "[t]here may be cases in which a
suspect's age will be relevant to the [Miranda] 'custody' inquiry."43
Her concurrence focused heavily on the fact that Alvarado was
almost eighteen at the time of his questioning." Read in its entirety,
Justice O'Connor's concurrence makes clear that she did not intend
her deciding vote in Alvarado to create a categorical rule against the
consideration of age in the custody inquiry.45
B. North Carolina Precedent on the "In Custody" Inquiry
Whatever its meaning, Alvarado is not precedential for an
inquiry under section 2101.46 The In re J.D.B. court was not bound by
43. Id. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44. See id. The In re J.D.B. court's leap-from Alvarado's holding that not
considering a juvenile's age in the totality of the circumstances was not a clearly erroneous
application of federal law to In re J.D.B.'s conclusion that age cannot be appropriately
considered in such an inquiry-is the central question presented to the United States
Supreme Court in J.D.B.'s recently granted petition for certiorari. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at i, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, No. 09-11121, 2010 WL 4278709 (U.S. May 28,
2010) (presenting the question of "[w]hether a court may consider a juvenile's age in a
Miranda custody analysis in evaluating the totality of the circumstances").
45. See Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The concurrence in its
entirety reads:
I join the opinion of the Court, but write separately to express an additional
reason for reversal. There may be cases in which a suspect's age will be relevant to
the "custody" inquiry under Miranda v. Arizona. In this case, however, Alvarado
was almost 18 years old at the time of his interview. It is difficult to expect police
to recognize that a suspect is a juvenile when he is so close to the age of majority.
Even when police do know a suspect's age, it may be difficult for them to ascertain
what bearing it has on the likelihood that the suspect would feel free to leave. That
is especially true here; 17 1/2-year-olds vary widely in their reactions to police
questioning, and many can be expected to behave as adults. Given these
difficulties, I agree that the state court's decision in this case cannot be called an
unreasonable application of federal law simply because it failed explicitly to
mention Alvarado's age.
Id. (citations omitted).
46. The In re J.D.B. majority admitted that Alvarado was not controlling because of
the procedural nature of its decision, but it failed to note that federal interpretations of
Miranda in general do not control the court's interpretation of complementary sections of
the Juvenile Justice Code. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. 664, 672 n.1, 686 S.E.2d 135, 140 n.1
(2009) ("We are aware that Alvarado is not binding on this Court because the Supreme
Court of the United States merely held in that case that '[t]he state court considered the
proper factors and reached a reasonable conclusion' and, thus, that an application for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) should not have been granted."
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federal precedent in interpreting a North Carolina law.47 Yet despite
this freedom, the In re J.D.B. majority latched onto the most logically
suspect, widely criticized,48 and dubiously authoritative49 language in
Alvarado and found that age was a subjective factor not to be
accounted for in the reasonable person standard of a custody
inquiry."o Quoting Alvarado, the court opined:
This Court adheres to the view that "the custody inquiry states
an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police,
while consideration of a suspect's individual characteristics-
including his age-could be viewed as creating a subjective
inquiry." Under the circumstances of the case sub judice, we
decline to extend the test for custody to include consideration
of the age and academic standing of an individual subjected to
questioning by police."
In adopting this language from Alvarado, In re J.D.B. did in
North Carolina what Alvarado could not do in the federal courts: it
created a bright line rule against the consideration of a suspect's age
in the test for custody. Without elucidation or support, Alvarado
introduced the idea that age was a "subjective" factor not to be
examined in the test for custody, and under cover of this dicta, In re
J.D.B. made the idea law in North Carolina, without citing North
Carolina precedent or providing a coherent rationale for the change.
This bright line rule against the consideration of age is at odds
with North Carolina precedent. In In re J.D.B., the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, without acknowledging that it was doing so,
implicitly overruled its previous holding in State v. Smith52 that age
(quoting Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 669)), cert. granted sub nom. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 79
U.S.L.W. 3268 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2010). Justice Brady noted this fact in his dissent. Id. at 674,
686 S.E.2d at 141 (Brady, J., dissenting).
47. While neither the majority nor the dissent directly addressed the question, the In
re J.D.B. court, while required to provide the minimum protections demanded by the
Federal Constitution, was free to interpret North Carolina's analogue to the Fifth
Amendment, article I, section 19 of the state constitution, as well as the Juvenile Justice
Act, to provide greater protection than federal law provides. See State ex rel. Martin v.
Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 449-50, 385 S.E.2d 473, 479 (1989) ("In construing and applying our
laws and the Constitution of North Carolina, this Court is not bound by the decisions of
federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States.").
48. See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles After
Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 433-37 (2008).
49. See discussion supra Part II.A.
50. In reJ.D.B., 363 N.C. at 672, 686 S.E.2d at 140.
51. Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
52. 317 N.C. 100, 343 S.E.2d 518 (1986), abrogated in part by State v. Buchanan, 353
N.C. 332, 543 S.E.2d 823 (2001).
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was a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances test
for custody." Smith used a defendant's age as a consideration to
determine whether he was in custody under the almost identical
predecessor5 4 of current section 2101" :
At no time was defendant told that he was free to leave. In fact,
the constant presence of law enforcement officers with firearms
would suggest the contrary to a person of defendant's age and
experience.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that a reasonable
person in defendant's position would have believed that he was
free to go or that his freedom of action was not being deprived
in a significant way. Therefore, we conclude that defendant was
"in custody" at the time his confession was obtained.
The State contends that the facts of this case are so similar to
the facts in Oregon v. Mathiason and State v. Jackson that those
cases should control the decision here. In each of those cases, it
was determined that the defendant was not in custody.
However, we note that the defendant in each of those cases was
an adult.. . . Therefore, we do not find these cases controlling.56
Smith unmistakably considered age as a relevant factor in the
inquiry." In an obfuscating circumnavigation of this reality, the In re
J.D.B majority proclaimed that "[t]his Court has not accounted for
such matters in conducting the proper custody inquiry in the past."
The majority implies that Smith is not of precedential value because it
utilized an articulation of the "reasonable person" custody inquiry
that was ruled improper by State v. Buchanan5 9 in 2001.
At issue in Buchanan was whether
the trial court's inquiry was based on the incorrect standard of
whether a reasonable person in defendant's position, under the
totality of the circumstances, would have felt "free to leave,"
rather than whether a reasonable person would have perceived
53. See In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 674, 686 S.E.2d at 140 (Brady, J., dissenting); Smith,
317 N.C. at 105, 343 S.E.2d at 520-21.
54. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-595 (1986) (repealed 1998).
55. See Smith, 317 N.C. at 105, 343 S.E.2d at 520-21.
56. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
57. See id. at 104-05, 343 S.E.2d at 520-21.
58. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 671, 686 S.E.2d at 139 (emphasis added).
59. 353 N.C. 332, 339-40, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001); see discussion infra Part II.C.
692 [Vol. 89
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that there was a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest."'
Buchanan explicitly rejected the articulation of the test that asked
whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would feel "free
to leave."61 In doing so, it disavowed prior cases "[t]o the extent" that
they had utilized this standard, declaring:
[t]o the extent that [Smith and other North Carolina cases] have
stated or implied that the determination of whether a defendant
is "in custody" for Miranda purposes is based on a standard
other than the "ultimate inquiry" of whether there is a "formal
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest," that language is disavowed.6 2
In cleaning up the Miranda custody inquiry, Buchanan did not throw
out the baby with the bathwater. That is to say, it did not obliterate all
precedential value of every prior case that used the "free to leave"
language. Rather, it disavowed the offending language.
Except for its use of the offending "free to leave" language,
Smith's articulation of the Miranda custody test remains the law in
North Carolina. Smith's description of the custody test as an
"objective test" of "whether 'a reasonable person in the suspect's
position would believe himself to be in custody or that his freedom of
action was deprived in some significant way,' "63 is practically
identical to the test the In re J.D.B. majority adopted. Quoting
Buchanan and State v. Greene, the In re J.D.B. majority noted that
"the definitive [custody] inquiry is whether there was a formal
arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest." This inquiry requires
application of "an objective test as to whether a reasonable
person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to
60. Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 336, 543 S.E.2d at 826 (quoting State v. Gaines, 345 N.C.
647, 662, 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 (1997)).
61. Id. at 340, 543 S.E.2d at 828.
62. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662, 483 S.E.2d 396,
405 (1997)).
63. State v. Smith, 317 N.C. 100, 104, 343 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1986) (misquoting Oregon
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494 (1977) (per curiam)), abrogated in part by State v.
Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 543 S.E.2d 823 (2001).
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be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of
action in some significant way."'
It is not hard to imagine why the majority was less than forthright
about its evasion of the Smith precedent. The hidden hairsplitting' by
the majority was not, as the opinion intimates," between an objective
"reasonable person" test and something else, but between two
objective "reasonable person" tests-one of which used the phrase
"free to leave." 67 As Justice Brady stated flatly in dissent, "this Court
has found it appropriate to consider the subject's age under the
reasonable person standard of the Miranda 'in custody' analysis."'
The next section outlines how the distinction drawn by the majority
to avoid Smith's clear precedent is a logically vacuous one.
C. The Twin Tests for "Custody" and "Seizure" in North Carolina
Beyond ignoring-or perhaps, in order to ignore-the court's
analysis in Smith, the In re J.D.B. majority disregarded the logical
chasm it was creating by no longer allowing age to be considered in
the custody test but still allowing age to be considered in the seizure
analysis. As outlined below, the reasonable person tests for Fourth
Amendment seizure and Fifth Amendment custody inquiries are
64. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. 664, 669, 686 S.E.2d 135, 138 (2009) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted), cert. granted sub nom. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 79 U.S.L.W. 3268
(U.S. Nov. 1, 2010).
65. The majority had set the stage for this hidden hairsplitting earlier in the opinion:
Notably, the inquiry as to " 'whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest,' " is not
equivalent to the broader "free to leave" test that "has long been used for
determining, under the Fourth Amendment, whether a person has been seized."
Id. (citations omitted).
66. The majority opinion juxtaposes its recent use of the "objective 'reasonable
person' standard" with its contention that it has not taken a suspect's age into account
when "conducting the proper custody" analysis:
This Court has not accounted for such matters in conducting the proper custody
inquiry in the past. In the recent case of In re W.R., for example, we considered
whether the questioning of a fourteen-year-old juvenile was custodial in nature. In
reversing the Court of Appeals' holding that the juvenile was in custody, we
applied the objective "reasonable person" standard, and at no point did we consider
the juvenile's age.
Id. at 671, 686 S.E.2d at 139 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
67. Smith, 317 N.C. at 104, 343 S.E.2d at 520. In fact, Smith did not use the "free to
leave language" in its sentence articulating the reasonable person test but included the
language in a subsequent sentence rearticulating the test. See id.
68. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 674, 686 S.E.2d at 141 (Brady, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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intimately linked both analytically and historically. Because the tests
are essentially the same, there is no logical reason for considering age
in one context and ignoring it in the other, but that is the position in
which In re J.D.B.'s reversal of Smith leaves North Carolina law.69
Before State v. Buchanan was decided in 2001, North Carolina
had long used the same test for both Fourth Amendment seizure
analysis and Fifth Amendment in-custody analysis. 0 The adoption of
this "free to leave" standard predates the court's decision that the test
for custody should be objective. In the 1979 decision State v. Perry,n
the Supreme Court of North Carolina (reacting to a national debate)
explored, without explicitly deciding, the issue of
whether this test [for custody] should be objectively applied and
involve determining whether a reasonable person would believe
under the circumstances that he was free to leave, or whether it
should be subjectively applied and involve determining whether
the defendant believed, even unreasonably, that his freedom of
movement was significantly restricted.72
Following Perry, the court explicitly adopted an objective test in
State v. Davis.73 Tellingly, Davis cited United States v. Mendenhall,4
the landmark Fourth Amendment case, to support its adoption of an
objective test for the Fifth Amendment custody inquiry under
Miranda. Smith continued using this objective reasonable person
69. Compare In re I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 584, 647 S.E.2d 129, 134 (2007) (finding
age to be a relevant consideration in the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis), with In re
J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 672, 686 S.E.2d at 140 (holding that age cannot be considered in the
Fifth Amendment in-custody analysis).
70. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 410, 419, 290 S.E.2d 574, 580-81, 586 (1982)
(using the same test and facts to determine both a Miranda inquiry issue and a Fourth
Amendment seizure question).
71. 298 N.C. 502, 259 S.E.2d 496 (1979).
72. Id. at 506-07, 259 S.E.2d at 499 (emphasis added).
73. Davis, 305 N.C. at 410,290 S.E.2d at 580-81.
74. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
75. Davis, 305 N.C. at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 580-81. Recognizing that both inquiries used
the same test, Davis cited directly to Mendenhall's newly articulated reasonable person
standard since the United States Supreme Court had not yet explicitly adopted that
standard in a Miranda situation. Id. For this standard's later adoption by the United States
Supreme Court, see Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) ("Two discrete
inquiries are essential to the [custody] determination: first, what were the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable
person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.");
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) ("A policeman's unarticulated plan has no
bearing on the question whether a suspect was 'in custody' at a particular time; the only
relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood
his situation."). Thus, Davis adopted the following custody inquiry from the Fourth
Amendment seizure test in Mendenhall:
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seizure/custody test and included age as a factor in the test.76 It was
not until 2001 that the Supreme Court of North Carolina changed
course in State v. Buchanan and declared that "free to leave" was not
the appropriate test for a Miranda custody inquiry.7 In Buchanan, the
court differentiated the two inquiries, noting that the custody test
"requires circumstances which go beyond those supporting a finding
of temporary seizure and create an objectively reasonable belief that
one is actually or ostensibly 'in custody.' ""
The In re J.D.B. majority correctly noted that, after Buchanan,
the test for custody is distinct from the "free to leave" test still utilized
to determine Fourth Amendment seizures.7 ' Nevertheless, as the
court's own multi-decade collapsing of the tests would indicate, they
are analytically very similar beasts. Both tests gauge the same basic
occurrence-police restraint of an individual's freedom. Both are
"objective" tests that look toward the totality of the circumstances.so
Both tests ultimately ask how a "reasonable person" would feel in
those circumstances. The essential distinction between the two tests
In determining whether a defendant is "in custody" for Miranda purposes,
however, the reviewing court may rely upon neither the subjective intent of the
police to restrain him nor the subjective belief of the defendant as to what the
police would do if he attempted to leave. Instead, the reviewing court must
determine whether the suspect was in custody based upon an objective test of
whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would believe that he had
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way or, to the contrary, would believe that he was free to go at will.
Davis, 305 N.C. at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 580-81 (emphasis added) (citing Mendenhall, 446
U.S. at 554).
76. State v. Smith, 317 N.C. 100, 104-05, 343 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1986), abrogated in part
by State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 543 S.E.2d 823 (2001). In Smith, the court
misattributed the Davis test-and language almost identical to Davis's articulation of that
test-to Oregon v. Mathiason. Id. (misquoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494
(1977) (per curiam)).
77. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 339-40, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001).
78. Id. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 828 (citations omitted).
79. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. 664, 669, 686 S.E.2d 135, 138 (2009), cert. granted sub nom.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 79 U.S.L.W. 3268 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2010).
80. Compare In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 669, 686 S.E.2d at 138 (performing Fifth
Amendment custody analysis), with State v. Freeman, 307 N.C. 357, 360, 298 S.E.2d 331,
333 (1983) (performing Fourth Amendment seizure analysis).
81. Compare In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 669, 686 S.E.2d at 138 (performing Fifth
Amendment custody analysis), with Freeman, 307 N.C. at 360. 298 S.E.2d at 333
(performing Fourth Amendment seizure analysis). Freeman articulated the following test
for Fourth Amendment seizures:
Neither the subjective beliefs of law enforcement officers nor those of a
defendant with regard to whether the defendant is free to leave at will are
dispositive of the question of whether he has been seized within the meaning of
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is that the "reasonable person" is, in one instance, asked whether he
believes himself "free to go" and, in the other, whether he believes
"himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom
of action in some significant way."8 2 In light of this reality, there is no
logical reason for considering age in one of these tests but not the
other.
Yet that is precisely the situation that In re J.D.B. created in
North Carolina. While not completely settled law, the Fourth
Amendment seizure test has generally allowed for the consideration
of a juvenile's age.83 In Kaupp v. Texas, a unanimous United States
Supreme Court included the suspect's age in its examination of the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the illegal seizure of the
defendant." While the Supreme Court of North Carolina has not
ruled on the question, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in In re
I.R. T,86 noted the similarity to the Fifth Amendment context and
explicitly held that age is a relevant factor in the seizure test:
A defendant's age has been used to determine whether he was
in custody," but the test to determine custody is not identical to
the test to determine whether a seizure has occurred. That said,
we see no legal or common sense reason to make a distinction.
Thus, we hold that the age of a juvenile is a relevant factor in
the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the test is objective in nature. For purposes of
Fourth Amendment analysis, a person has been seized "only if, in view of all of
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave."
Freeman, 307 N.C. at 360, 298 S.E.2d at 333 (citations omitted).
82. State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992) (citing Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 497 (1977) (per curiam)).
83. See, e.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631 (2003) (per curiam).
84. 538 U.S. 626 (2003) (per curiam).
85. See id. at 631. The court wrote:
A 17-year-old boy was awakened in his bedroom at three in the morning by at
least three police officers, one of whom stated "we need to go and talk." He was
taken out in handcuffs, without shoes, dressed only in his underwear in January,
placed in a patrol car, driven to the scene of a crime and then to the sheriff's
offices, where he was taken into an interrogation room and questioned.
Id.
86. In re I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 647 S.E.2d 129 (2007).
87. While the Court of Appeals of North Carolina gave no citation for this
proposition, the obvious case intended is State v. Smith, 317 N.C. 100, 104-05, 343 S.E.2d
518, 520 (1986), abrogated in part by State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 340, 543 S.E.2d 823,
828. See supra text accompanying notes 52-68.
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determining whether a seizure has occurred within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment."
In re L R. T. is the law in North Carolina unless and until the
United States Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of North
Carolina overrules it. While it is hard to predict how the state's
supreme court would rule on the issue in light of the holding in In re
J.D.B., the United States Supreme Court does not appear poised to
apply its controversial suggestion in Alvarado to the Fourth
Amendment context." Both In re J.D.B.'s prohibition on considering
age in the reasonable person standard for custody determinations and
In re I. R. T.'s age-sensitive reasonable person test for determining
Fourth Amendment seizures remain good law in North Carolina. No
logical reason or public policy consideration supports this divide.
D. Public Policy Goals Support the Consideration of Age in the "In-
Custody" Test
In re J.D.B. stands in opposition to the widely shared public
policy judgment that, in many situations, age matters. The generally
held societal belief that children differ from adults, and therefore
require differential treatment in some contexts, has found expression
in our laws.90 In North Carolina, one prominent example of this
phenomenon is the Juvenile Justice Act." Further, North Carolina's
recognition of the legal salience of age reflects a deeply-rooted
principle in American law which further counsels against use of the
age-insensitive test promulgated by In re J.D.B.
In re J.D.B.'s failure to consider age as a relevant circumstance in
the in-custody determination runs contrary to the animating
principles behind the Juvenile Justice Act. The people of North
Carolina, through their elected legislators, have repeatedly endorsed
the view that children should be given enhanced Miranda warnings."
88. In re I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. at 584, 647 S.E.2d at 134 (citations omitted).
89. In a ruling recently denied certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court of Illinois declared that "[w]hen assessing whether a juvenile was seized
for purposes of the fourth amendment, we modify the ... reasonable person standard to
consider whether a reasonable juvenile would have thought that his freedom of movement
was restricted." People v. Lopez, 892 N.E.2d 1047, 1061 (Ill. 2008) (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 998 (2009).
90. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-74 (2005).
91. Juvenile Justice Reform Act, ch. 202, 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws 695 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. chs. 7, 14, 17, 114, 115, 143, 147, and
153).
92. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-595 (1986)
(repealed 1998).
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As Justice Brady reasoned in dissent, it is only "logical that age
should be considered as part of the reasonable person standard in a
custody analysis under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101."93 In passing section 7B-
2101, the General Assembly expressed a policy judgment that the
unique vulnerabilities of children should be taken into account in the
level of procedural protection against self-incrimination that juveniles
receive. In re J.D.B. assumes, without explaining, that the General
Assembly created a separate, enhanced Miranda law for juveniles,
but it intended that the custodial determination-the sole gateway to
enjoy these protections-be an adult standard. In this light, it is hard
to miss the bitter irony of the majority's stark refusal to consider
J.D.B.'s juvenile status in applying the foundational test used to judge
whether his rights under the statute were triggered. As Justice Brady
wrote: "[t]he entire Code was created to ensure unique services for
juveniles because of the special circumstances inherent in their youth;
to ignore age when interpreting any section of the Juvenile Code
defies common sense and the very purpose of the Code."94
Similarly, courts have long recognized, under the voluntariness
inquiry, the unique vulnerabilities of children during police
questioning. In Haley v. Ohio,95 a 1946 decision, the Supreme Court
held that the interrogation of a fifteen-year-old boy violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Referring to the
juvenile as "a mere child-an easy victim of the law," the Court
concluded of his lengthy interrogation, "we cannot believe that a lad
of tender years is a match for the police in such a contest."" Stressing
the common sense conclusion that age matters during coercive police
questioning, the Court reasoned, "15 is a tender and difficult age for a
boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards
of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens."" In Gallegos v.
Colorado,99 the Court elaborated on this theme, noting that to
disregard the "youth and immaturity of the petitioner" would "be in
callous disregard of this boy's constitutional rights."" Because of the
juvenile's "unequal footing with his interrogators," the Court
93. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. 664, 674, 686 S.E.2d 135, 141 (2009) (Brady, J., dissenting),
cert. granted sub nom. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 79 U.S.L.W. 3268 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2010).
94. Id. at 675, 686 S.E.2d at 141.
95. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
96. Id. at 600-01.
97. Id. at 599-600.
98. Id. at 599.
99. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
100. Id. at 54.
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reasoned, an unaided "14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let
alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had."101 In light of this
belief, the Gallegos Court concluded that to "allow this conviction to
stand would, in effect, be to treat [the juvenile] as if he had no
constitutional rights." 102
This central concern-the danger that disregarding the reality of
a juvenile's age will effectively deny him his constitutional rights-is
equally present in today's custodial interrogation determinations.
Miranda's safeguards are utterly denied unless they are triggered by a
finding that the suspect was "in custody."o 3 If age is not taken into
consideration for this foundational inquiry, all Miranda protections
may well be lost. It is of little consolation for the child whose age is
disregarded by a court and is therefore found not to be in custody
(and thus to have no Miranda rights at all)' that, had he been found
to have been in custody, his age would have been a factor in
examining whether he had made an effective waiver of his now
triggered Miranda rights.10
Both common sense and modern science support the Court's
observations about the special vulnerability of juveniles to police
coercion as a result of children's immature decision making
capabilities and of the extreme power differential in play when the
police question a juvenile.106 Importantly, the frontal lobe, which is
critical to making rational decisions based on long-term outcomes,0"
101. Id.
102. Id. at 54-55.
103. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. 664, 669, 686 S.E.2d 135, 138 (2009) (citations omitted)
(stating that the "protections of Miranda and section 7B-2101(a) apply only to custodial
interrogations by law enforcement"), cert. granted sub nom. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 79
U.S.L.W. 3268 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2010).
104. Id. at 672, 686 S.E.2d at 140 (declining to consider J.D.B.'s age in the "in custody"
determination and subsequently finding that J.D.B. was not in custody and thus "was not
entitled to the protections of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a) and Miranda v. Arizona").
105. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (holding that age is a factor for
consideration in determining whether an intelligent waiver of rights has been made); In re
J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 671, 686 S.E.2d at 140; State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 8, 305 S.E.2d 685,
690 (1983) (holding that age is a factor for consideration in determining whether an
intelligent waiver of rights has been made).
106. Jennifer Park, Yarborough v. Alvarado: At the Crossroads of the "Unreasonable
Application" Provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and
the Consideration of Juvenile Status in Custodial Determinations, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 871, 900 (2005).
107. See, e.g., Antonio R. Damasio & Steven W. Anderson, The Frontal Lobes, in
CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 404, 434 (Kenneth M. Heilman & Edward Valenstein
eds., 4th ed. 2003) (noting that a "hallmark of frontal lobe dysfunction is difficulty making
decisions that are in the long-term best interests of the patient").
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is among the last areas of the brain to develop in humans.osAt the
same time, in interactions with the police, "juveniles' relative
emotional immaturity and dependence upon adults renders them
more vulnerable to pressure and to suggestion."'" Additionally,
juveniles frequently hold the erroneous belief that cooperating
completely with police will help end the questioning quickly and will
provide the most beneficial outcome for themselves and their
families.110
Clear public policy goals, as well as the fundamental principles of
the Juvenile Justice Act, are well served by the consideration of age
as a factor in the totality of the circumstances test for custody. In
opposition to these interests-if we are to believe the In re J.D.B. and
Alvarado majorities-is the need for simplicity. Simplicity is
promoted, in the first instance, by the courts giving police " 'clear
guidance' ""' and "ensuring that [they] do not need 'to make guesses
as to [the circumstances] at issue before deciding how they may
interrogate the suspect.' "112 Similarly, simplicity is fostered by the
courts in the form of an "objective test" that "furthers 'the clarity of
[Miranda's] rule.' "113 On a basic level, not taking into account a
juvenile's age simplifies the decision-making tasks of both judges and
the police-a desirable outcome, no doubt. Yet this line of argument,
reducto ad absurdum, finds increasing simplicity as the decision-
maker accounts for less and less in the analysis until-at the sublime
endpoint-absolute simplicity is achieved through the analysis of
nothing.
This reducto ad absurdum exposes the central fallacies of the
simplicity argument: justice requires that facts be taken into account,
and at some point, the refusal to consider relevant circumstances (or,
in the extreme example, anything at all) results in a grave miscarriage
of justice. As desirable as providing simplicity and clarity for police
and judges alike may be, it is not the primary aim of the law. Thus,
108. See, e.g., Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development
During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8177
(2004).
109. Delton W. Young, Juvenile's Waiver of Miranda Rights: Competence and
Evaluation, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Apr. 2002, at 30,30-31.
110. Id. at 31.
111. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. 664, 672, 686 S.E.2d 135,140 (2009) (quoting Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004)), cert. granted sub nom. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 79
U.S.L.W. 3268 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2010).
112. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667 (2004) (second alteration in original)
(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984)).
113. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430
(1984)).
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the appropriate inquiry for a court in choosing what information to
include or ignore in its analysis is to first examine what information
needs to be considered to justly give effect to the law. In the case of
Miranda and section 2101, the overriding purpose of the law is to
safeguard the individual's right to avoid self-incrimination against the
coercive power of the police.114 These procedural safeguards are
triggered whenever an "in-custody interrogation," with its "inherently
compelling pressures," occurs."' In In re J.D.B., the court was
charged with determining whether J.D.B. was in custody. In
answering this question, the court's analysis-that is to say the in-
custody test they employed-should have taken into account all those
factors necessary to justly resolve the issue. The public policy
considerations outlined above" suggest that J.D.B.'s age was one
such factor. In such a situation, the benefits of increased simplicity in
the administration of the law should not override the necessity of
considering those factors required for the just administration of the
law.
In the aftermath of the Alvarado decision, critics have written
copiously about the arguments for considering age in the custody
test,'17 but there is, perhaps not unsurprisingly, a dearth of scholarly
writing making policy arguments to support ignoring age in the test.
One recent commentator has, however, advanced an in-depth policy
argument against the use of age as a factor in the Fourth Amendment
seizure context under the rule in In re LR. T.1 Is He claims that
"subjectifying the seizure inquiry" and "imposing differential
114. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) ("We have concluded that without
proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused
of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively
apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.").
115. Id.
116. See discussion supra Part II.D.
117. See, e.g., Park, supra note 106, at 900 (discussing the cognitive, emotional, and
societal reasons that juveniles are more vulnerable than adults in custodial interrogations);
Peter B. Rutledge, Miranda and Reasonableness, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1011, 1025 (2005)
(arguing against Alvarado's dismissal of age as a factor in the custody test by noting that it
would "reduce the prophylactic protections to particularly vulnerable suspects"); Tyson B.
Nelson, Comment, The Contradictory Miranda Totality Tests: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Decision in Yarborough v. Alvarado, 26 J. Juv. L. 94, 109 (2006) (arguing that,
despite Alvarado, age should be considered in the totality of the circumstances test for
determining custody).
118. Jonathan S. Carter, Recent Development, You're Only as "Free to Leave" as You
Feel: Police Encounters with Juveniles and the Trouble with Differential Standards for
Investigatory Stops Under In re I.R.T., 88 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1391 (2010).
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standards ... to account for age"' 19: (1) "exponentially increases the
circumstances in which a police-juvenile encounter will be deemed a
seizure";'20 (2) "fosters uncertainty by forcing police to guess when
their conduct is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment thereby
frustrating police investigatory techniques essential to effective
deterrence of crime" ;121 and (3) "establishes a slippery slope
precedent that encourages overreaching by judges to incorporate
other individual variations into the seizure analysis that risk rendering
the test meaningless as a gauge of proper police conduct and
ineffective as a check on abusive police behavior."1 22 At least in the
Miranda context, these contentions lack merit.
Argument (1) rests on the premise that such an increase would
be a bad thing. It is equally true to say that not using a differential
standard for age "exponentially" decreases the situations in which a
juvenile would be deemed in custody. In any event, the extreme
negative repercussions of having police more frequently give
enhanced Miranda warnings to juveniles are hard to imagine. Perhaps
more children may ask for their parents, "lawyer up," or otherwise
more effectively assert their right to avoid self-incrimination, but of
course, that is precisely the point.
Argument (2) is another example of the simplicity argument
advanced by Alvarado and In re J.D.B. that is examined above. It
should be noted that, whatever its dubious merits in the larger set of
Miranda cases, it has no force for the inquiry in In re J.D.B. First, it
has no merit because, in point of fact, the investigator questioning
J.D.B. did not need to do any guesswork in determining the juvenile
status of a seventh grader he had removed from class.123 Second, and




123. Justice Brady pointedly noted this fact in his dissent:
Here, the difficulty of guessing defendant's age is nonexistent. Investigator
DiCostanzo sought out J.D.B. at a middle school, where he knew J.D.B. was a
seventh-grade student. All seventh graders are juveniles, roughly between the
ages of twelve and fourteen, and as Investigator DiCostanzo testified, he was able
to obtain J.D.B.'s exact age from school records. Therefore, defendant's
"frailty"-his youth-was evident from the very location Investigator DiCostanzo
selected to conduct the interrogation. Additionally, Investigator DiCostanzo was
a juvenile investigator with the Chapel Hill Police Department, specially trained
in dealing with juveniles and educated in laws concerning their rights.
In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. 664, 675-76, 686 S.E.2d 135, 142 (2009) (Brady, J., dissenting), cert.
granted sub nom. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 79 U.S.L.W. 3268 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2010).
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more broadly, it has no merit because the North Carolina General
Assembly has already imposed the burden of determining juvenile
status on police by adopting section 2101.124
Argument (3) ignores the unique legal salience of age.125 Smith's
consideration of age in the custody inquiry did not lead to a rash of
judicial activism seeking "individual variations" among people in the
test. Moreover, in the context of section 2101, the slippery slope
argument is particularly inapt. The legislature has singled out age as
an important consideration in the Miranda context; there is little
reason to think that the courts would arbitrarily expand into
consideration of other factors.
On balance, public policy concerns strongly support including
age as a factor in the in-custody test. The widely subscribed belief that
children are different, and that these differences merit differential
treatment for juveniles and adults, has supported the legal salience of
age in many other contexts.126 The already dubious public policy
arguments against differential treatment by age in the Miranda
custody context lose all force when juxtaposed with the General
Assembly's judgment expressed in section 2101 that age does matter
in the Miranda context.
III. CHILDREN AT SCHOOL NEED HEIGHTENED, NOT LOWERED,
PROTECTION AGAINST COERCION BY THE POLICE
Beyond mandating an age-insensitive test for determining
custody under section 2101, In re J.D.B. drew a logically fallacious
and ultimately harmful distinction between questioning that takes
place within school and that which takes place outside of school. The
perverse effect of this distinction is to actually require a greater
restraint on freedom to find a student in custody than an adult. This
distinction cannot be justified by prior case law and, contrary to
124. Indeed, under section 2101, police not only have to differentiate between juveniles
and adults but also between those under fourteen and those over. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7B-2101(a)-(b) (2009).
125. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571-74 (2005) (relying on the developmental
differences between adolescents and adults to create a per se rule that execution of a
defendant who was under eighteen years old at the time of the crime violates the Eighth
Amendment).
126. The law has historically recognized the difference between juveniles and adults in
two key ways: first, by "compensating for youthful vulnerability," often in a parens patria
(parent substitute) role; and, second, by recognizing constitutional protections for children
often "not commensurate with those of adults." PAUL R. KFOURY, CHILDREN BEFORE
THE COURT: REFLECTIONS ON LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING MINORS 107 (Butterworth
Legal Publishers 1991) (1987).
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important public policy concerns, creates a dangerous incentive for
police to target children for interrogation at school.
A. In re J.D.B.'s Dismissal of the School Environment's Inherent
Restraint on Freedom as Not Only Insignificant but as Actually
Raising the Threshold at Which an Interaction Becomes Custodial
Runs Contrary to Logic and Established Law
Restraint on student freedom while at school is a pedagogical
necessity and, thus, a reality. The In re J.D.B. majority, recognizing
that students in school are to some degree already in custody of the
state, observed that "[t]he uniquely structured nature of the school
environment inherently deprives students of some freedom of
action."'2 7 With a perfunctory dismissal, the majority's next two
sentences discounted any "typical" restriction on a student's freedom
as immaterial to the custody determination:
However, the typical restrictions of the school setting apply to
all students and do not constitute a "significant deprivation of
freedom of action" under the test set forth in Greene. For a
student in the school setting to be deemed in custody, law
enforcement must subject the student to " 'restraint on freedom
of movement' " that goes well beyond the limitations that are
characteristic of the school environment in general.128
Without providing any support for the notion, the majority
introduces here a whole new tenet to the in-custody test-a minimum
bar for finding a suspect in custody at school. This new minimum bar
requires that police curtail a student's freedom "well beyond the
limitations that are characteristic of the school environment in
general" before a student can be found in custody.'29 Such an addition
to the custody test is illogical.' The established custody test, as the
majority notes, queries "whether a reasonable person in the position
127. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 669, 686 S.E.2d at 138.
128. Id. at 669-70, 686 S.E.2d at 138 (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 670, 686 S.E.2d at 138.
130. As Justice Hudson lamented in her dissent:
I fear that the majority here actually affords juveniles less protection when
questioned by law enforcement officers at school, as compared to elsewhere. In
my opinion, in the school environment, where juveniles are faced with a variety of
negative consequences-including potential criminal charges-for refusing to
comply with the requests or commands of authority figures, the circumstances are
inherently more coercive and require more, not less, careful protection of the
rights of the juvenile.
Id. at 683, 686 S.E.2d at 147 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
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of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had
been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way."13 '
The only way that the majority's new minimum bar can be
incorporated into this test is by making the dubious assumption that a
"reasonable person" in school (that is, the "position of the
defendant") would only believe himself "to be in custody" or
"deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way"'32 when
the restraint on freedom imposed upon him by the police "goes well
beyond the limitations that are characteristic of the school
environment in general."133 Such an assumption strains credulity.
The In re J.D.B. majority's modification of the custody test can
be viewed as providing two rules: (1) that the inherent restraint on
student freedom in the school context does not count toward the
restraint on freedom relevant in determining custody and (2) that
non-pedagogical restraint on freedom by the police must rise to a
much higher level than this inherent restraint on freedom before it
can form the basis for a finding of custody. Each of these rules is
fatally flawed.
First, in the Miranda context, the custody inquiry does not
distinguish between the reasons that a suspect's freedom is curtailed
by the state. Restraint of an individual's freedom-even when for a
legitimate purpose that is unrelated to the reason for the
questioning-still counts as restraint. For example, in Mathis v.
United States,13 4 the United States Supreme Court found that a
prisoner was in custody for Miranda purposes despite the fact that he
"had not been put in jail by the officers questioning him, but was
there for an entirely separate offense."'35 In that case, the Court
declared:
The Government ... seeks to narrow the scope of the Miranda
holding by making it applicable only to questioning one who is
"in custody" in connection with the very case under
investigation. There is no substance to such a distinction, and in
effect it goes against the whole purpose of the Miranda decision
which was designed to give meaningful protection to Fifth
Amendment rights. We find nothing in the Miranda opinion
which calls for a curtailment of the warnings to be given
131. State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992) (citing Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 497 (1977) (per curiam)).
132. Id.
133. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 670, 686 S.E.2d at 138.
134. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
135. Id. at 4.
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persons under interrogation by officers based on the reason
why the person is in custody.136
In Mathis, the restraint on the suspect's freedom was completely
unrelated to his questioning by authorities. That is to say, the
custodial element of the "custodial interrogation" in Mathis was
provided by the prison setting rather than by the (non-criminal)
Internal Revenue agent who interviewed Mathis. In In re J.D.B., on
the other hand, the suspect's freedom was restrained both by the
school setting and by the actions of the police investigator. 13 7 Yet,
rather than counting the unrelated custodial nature of the setting
toward the in-custody threshold as the Mathis court did, the In re
J.D.B. majority subtracted it by claiming that an in-custody finding is
only appropriate when police restraint "goes well beyond the
limitations that are characteristic of the school environment in
general."138 The incongruent result is that if the Internal Revenue
agent in Mathis had questioned Mathis outside of prison, the
questioning would not have been custodial. However, if the police
investigator in In re J.D.B. had questioned J.D.B. outside of school,
the In re J.D.B's majority's analysis would counsel toward just the
opposite result-that J.D.B. was now indeed in custody.
The In re J.D.B majority's underlying assumption in discounting,
rather than counting, the custodial nature of school in the in-custody
inquiry appears to be a belief that "the typical restrictions of the
school setting apply to all students and do not constitute a 'significant'
deprivation of freedom of action."139 Two separate contentions-both
untenable-about why such restrictions should be discounted can be
parsed from this statement: first, that the restrictions are "typical,"
and, second, that they are applied across the whole group ("all
students"). Of course, for a prisoner, the restraints of incarceration
are both "typical" and apply to all prisoners, yet, as the Court noted
in Mathis, "the whole purpose of the Miranda decision" demands that
such unrelated restraints on freedom be taken into account in
determining custody."
Furthermore, the assertion made by the In re J.D.B. majority
that, not only should the school environment's unrelated restraint on
freedom be ignored, but that it should instead provide a minimum bar
136. Id. at 4-5.
137. In reJ.D.B., 363 N.C. at 677-78, 686 S.E.2d at 143-44 (Brady, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 670, 686 S.E.2d at 138 (majority opinion).
139. Id. at 669, 686 S.E.2d at 138 (emphasis added).
140. Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4.
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that police restraint on the student's freedom must surpass before
custody is found fails even assuming, arguendo, that unrelated
restraints on freedom by the state should be ignored in the test. This
is to say that there is no logical reason for creating a heightened
baseline, based on the inherent curtailment of freedom in school, for
judging police restraint of a suspect's freedom. The fact that a
student's freedom of movement is curtailed while sitting in class does
not lessen the curtailment of freedom he experiences at the hands of
police. While being questioned by police, a reasonable person would
not believe himself to be any less "in custody" or "deprived of his
freedom of action in some significant way"14 ' merely because the
questioning was taking place in school (an environment where
restrictions on freedom abound). In other words, only an
unreasonable person would harbor such an irrational belief, yet,
implicitly, this is the very belief that the majority ascribes to the
reasonable person. After the majority's tinkering with the custody
test in the school context, the erstwhile "reasonable person" now
fancies himself "in custody" or "deprived of his freedom of action in
some significant way"142 only when the police restrain his freedom
"well beyond the limitations that are characteristic of the school
environment in general."143
B. Sound Public Policy Counsels Against In re J.D.B.'s Dismissal of
the School Environment's Inherent Restraint on Freedom as Not
Only Insignificant but as Actually Raising the Threshold at Which
an Interaction Becomes Custodial
Beyond its serious legal shortcomings, the majority's in-
school/out-of-school distinction will have unintended public policy
implications. Chief among these is the creation of a perverse incentive
for police to interrogate children at school in order to avoid having to
provide the procedural protections of section 2101. The resulting
failure to provide section 2101's protections to many students will
undermine the public policy goals sought to be advanced by the
statute. At the same time, police targeting of children at school will
interfere with schools' core pedagogical missions.
Even without providing a reprieve from the protections of
section 2101, schools are already an attractive venue for a police
141. State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992) (citing Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 497 (1977) (per curiam)).
142. Id.
143. In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 670, 686 S.E.2d at 138.
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investigator seeking a psychological edge over a suspect during
interrogation. As Justice Hudson noted in dissent, quoting a recent
commentator:
Questioning the student at school, the officer not only takes
advantage of the student's compulsory presence at school and
the background norm of submission to authority, but also
chooses to interact with the student at a time when the student
will not be in the presence of a parent, the figure most likely to
have the inclination or ability to either arrange for the presence
of counsel or to advise the youth to refuse to answer the
officer's questions.'"
Such was clearly the situation in In re J.D.B. In his dissent,
Justice Brady observed that "[1]aw enforcement in the instant case
took advantage of the middle school's restrictive environment and its
psychological effect by choosing to interrogate J.D.B. there, instead
of at his home or in any other public, more neutral location."145
This incentive to target children for interrogation at school
increases exponentially when coupled with the knowledge that the
trigger for granting Miranda rights is much heavier in the
schoolhouse. In her dissenting opinion in In re J.D.B., Justice Hudson
was "particularly concerned about creating an incentive for an
investigating police officer to enter a middle school to question a
juvenile about crimes that may have occurred away from school
grounds and to take advantage of the more restrictive school
atmosphere without providing the protections of [section 2101]."146
Nevertheless, under the majority's rule, the extreme psychological
advantages held by the police over a juvenile can now be exploited in
the schoolhouse in a large number of cases, In re J.D.B. included,
without triggering the very enhanced juvenile protections of section
2101 designed to protect children from such psychological
overpowering.
Perhaps the most compelling argument for treating in-school
interrogations differently than outside-of-school interrogations is the
unique imperatives of the school environment, where student rights
must often be balanced against overarching pedagogical concerns.
This balancing sometimes leads to serious curtailment of student
144. Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the Twenty-First
Century Schoolhouse, 52 LoY. L. REv.39, 85 n.175 (2006), quoted in In re J.D.B., 363 N.C.
at 683, 686 S.E.2d at 147 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
145. In re.J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 677, 686 S.E.2d at 143 (Brady, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 683-84, 686 S.E.2d at 147 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
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rights at school. 147 Why not impose a higher bar for an in-custody
finding at school? While such reasoning might apply in situations that
are beyond the scope of this Recent Development, it has no merit in
the situation at issue in In re J.D.B.
While in a broad sense, "in-school" interrogations might include
a wide variety of scenarios with variables such as whether the
interrogation was conducted by police or by school administrators
and whether the questioning was about an in-school or an out-of-
school incident, this Recent Development focuses its argument, as
well as its ultimate suggestions for reform, on at-school interrogations
by the police regarding a crime committed outside of the school-the
situation presented by In re J.D.B. It does so because this scenario is
the most troubling and the most analytically clean since the choice to
interrogate the student at school about any out-of-school incident is
utterly unrelated to any pedagogical concern. 148 in such a situation,
the usual argument for curtailing student rights in response to the
school environment's unique needs turns back on itself. Concerns
about good pedagogy do not justify bringing the police on school
grounds to interrogate suspects about outside events. Rather they
counsel against it. As Justice Brady noted of the situation in In re
J.D.B., "a public middle school, which should be an environment
where children feel safe and protected, became a place where a law
enforcement investigator claimed a tactical advantage over a
juvenile." 149 Police targeting of children at school is antithetical to the
"safe" environment Justice Brady recognized as essential to
learning.1s0 More directly, such targeting of children at school actually
removes the student unnecessarily from the pedagogical environment
of the classroom and may disturb the learning process for others who
observe a classmate escorted away by armed police, as J.D.B. was."'
147. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (finding that the
pedagogical environment of school "does not require strict adherence to the requirement
that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has
violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search."). Critically,
however, T. L. 0. explicitly limited this lowered standard to searches by school officials and
did not change the probable cause standard for searches by police or by police in
conjunction with school administrators. Id. at 341 n.7.
148. The picture becomes cloudier both logically and legally when the investigation is
more closely wedded to the pedagogical atmosphere, such as when a principal questions a
student about an in-school crime. On when questioning by school administrators
implicates Miranda rights, see Holland, supra note 144, at 39-41.
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This is perhaps what Justice Hudson had in mind when she decried
"the potential disruption of the learning atmosphere in the school . . .
if this practice [of at-school questioning by police] became
widespread."1 5 2
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR AMENDING SECTION 2101
Because of the extreme vulnerability of children to police
interrogation methods, some have argued for a per se rule requiring
the presence of counsel regardless of whether an interrogation is
considered custodial.153 Such a rule would sweep too broadly by
prohibiting many desirable police-juvenile interactions, and it would
create an extreme burden on the legal system by requiring the
appointment of counsel in virtually every police-juvenile encounter.
This Recent Development proposes a more modest statutory revision
to right the wrong of the In re J.D.B decision by clarifying that age is
a factor when applying the "in custody" test under section 2101 and
by creating a bright line rule that any questioning by police of a
student at school about an outside crime is custodial for purposes of
the statute.
Below are the current provisions of section 2101 with proposed
additions:
Interrogation procedures
(a) Any juvenile in custody must be advised prior to
questioning:
(1) That the juvenile has a right to remain silent;
(2) That any statement the juvenile does make can be and
may be used against the juvenile;
(3) That the juvenile has a right to have a parent, guardian,
or custodian present during questioning; and
(4) That the juvenile has a right to consult with an attorney
and that one will be appointed for the juvenile if the
juvenile is not represented and wants representation.
152. Id. at 684, 686 S.E.2d at 147 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
153. Ellen Marrus, Can I Talk Now?: Why Miranda Does Not Offer Adolescents
Adequate Protections, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 516, 517, 527 (2006) ("In order for children to be
adequately protected during police interrogation, the child should be entitled to the
presence of counsel prior to and during any questioning, regardless of whether the juvenile
is in custody.").
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(b) When the juvenile is less than 14 years of age, no in-custody
admission or confession resulting from interrogation may be
admitted into evidence unless the confession or admission was
made in the presence of the juvenile's parent, guardian,
custodian, or attorney. If an attorney is not present, the parent,
guardian, or custodian as well as the juvenile must be advised of
the juvenile's rights as set out in subsection (a) of this section;
however, a parent, guardian, or custodian may not waive any
right on behalf of the juvenile.
(c) If the juvenile indicates in any manner and at any stage of
questioning pursuant to this section that the juvenile does not
wish to be questioned further, the officer shall cease
questioning.
(d) Before admitting into evidence any statement resulting
from custodial interrogation, the court shall find that the
juvenile knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived the
juvenile's rights.154
[proposed addition] (e) A juvenile shall be "in-custody" for the
purpose of this section when, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable juvenile of the age and in the
position of the juvenile would believe himself to be in custody
or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some
significant way.
[proposed addition] (f) Notwithstanding subsection (e) of this
section, a juvenile who is questioned by police in school about
any crime having taken place outside of the school shall be "in-
custody" for the purpose of this section.
Proposed subsection (e) legislatively overrules the In re J.D.B.
decision and makes clear that a juvenile "in-custody" test is to be
used in applying the juvenile Miranda protections of the law.
Proposed subsection (f) creates a per se rule that prohibits police
from taking advantage of the pedagogical environment, and its
concomitant restrictions on student freedom and rights, to avoid
giving suspects their full procedural rights under the statute.
Subsection (f) only applies to questioning about outside crimes and
thus in no way interferes with the pedagogical needs of school
administrators to investigate and discipline students.
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101 (2009).
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These proposals are aimed at limiting the negative repercussions
of the In re J.D.B. ruling, and as such, they are modest-and
hopefully realistic-in their scope. Unfortunately, the good that such
amendments might accomplish through broadening the application of
procedural Miranda safeguards is limited: first, providing Miranda
warnings does not make children understand them"' or give them the
capacity to knowledgably waive them;16 second, subsection (f)'s per
se rule would not apply in the contexts of interrogation by school
administrators or of interrogation by the police regarding in-school
crimes."' Yet, adoption of these, or similar, amendments would
represent an important reaffirmation of the principles undergirding
section 2101's original adoption and would provide significantly
stronger Miranda protections to juveniles in North Carolina.
CONCLUSION
Turning on its head the legislature's reasoned judgment that
juvenile North Carolinians require heightened protection against
potentially coercive police interrogations, the In re J.D.B majority
issued a judicial fiat that not only denied the protection of section
2101 to many children by ignoring the very vulnerability of children
the statute was designed to protect, but also perversely made the
schoolhouse an arena where such enhanced Miranda protections for
juveniles are most parsimoniously applied.
The decision purports to protect the police from an untenable
requirement that they must foresee the myriad-unknown and
unknowable-variations of human nature and human frailty that
might cause a suspect to hold a subjective belief that she is in custody.
As this Recent Development has argued, there are easy and already
existing frameworks for considering age in an objective test, without
descending into the nightmarish swamp of subjectivity courts so
abhor. Rather than protecting the police from an utterly
unreasonable requirement of omniscience regarding a suspect's
subjective state of mind, the decision encourages police to use
objective knowledge about a suspect's age to purposefully create in
the suspect a belief that she is in custody. The decision allows police
to target the unique vulnerabilities of minors to psychological
interrogation practices at school, secure in the knowledge that (1) the
very objective fact (of the suspect's age) that they utilized to drive the
155. See Young, supra note 109, at 30.
156. See id. at 30-31.
157. For more on this thorny question, see Holland, supra note 144, at 39-41.
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suspect to self-incrimination will be quickly dismissed by judges as
improperly "subjective" and (2) that they are free to curtail the
juvenile's freedom of action so long as that restraint does not go "well
beyond" the level of restraint typically experienced by students at
school.
In response to the misguided decision in In re J.D.B., the
General Assembly should reaffirm its judgment that age does matter
in the Miranda context by adopting language making clear that age is
to be considered in the section 2101 in-custody analysis. Moreover,
the legislature should undo the perverse incentive to target children
at school by adopting a per se rule that police questioning at school
about a crime that takes place outside of school is considered
custodial under section 2101. Adopting these, or similar amendments,
would legislatively correct In re J.D.B.'s ill-advised judicial fiat and
ensure against the targeting of children for interrogation without the
procedural protections of section 2101.
CLAY TURNER
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